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Abstract 
This research compares policy outcome resulting from the legislative process and 
the direct ballot process to estimate the effect of political institutions on preference 
aggregation and policy outcomes. Using data from California statewide elections, we 
analyzing policies which were considered in both processes and for which the two processes 
led to different outcomes. Vve conclude that features of the legislature, especially party, 
may lead legislators to vote against their district majority preference, and therefore lead 
legislative and direct ballot outcomes to diverge. 
Legislatures, Initiatives, and Representation: 
Comparing the Effects of Institutions on Policy 
Outcomes 
Elisabeth R. Gerber 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, the direct ballot process has received a great deal of attention as an 
alternative to traditional legislative politics at the state and local levels.1 In this research, 
we consider the legislative and direct ballot processes as two alternative institutional 
arrangements for aggregating citizen preferences in democratic governments. The rules 
and procedures that define each process shape the way preferences are translated into 
outcomes. This means that the two processes may produce different outcomes in a given 
policy area, and that a given policy may be more (less) likely to pass if considered in one 
process than if considered in the other. 
We compare policy outcomes resulting from the legislative process and the direct 
ballot process for several policies which were considered in both processes. This is the case 
for any legislative initiative statute, legislative constitutional amendment, referendum, or 
bond issue, which must first be considered in the state legislature and then either accepted 
or rejected by the electorate. It can also be the case for citizen sponsored initiatives 
which are introduced in response to either failed or enacted legislation.2 The question is 
whether there are systematic differences in the policies the two processes produce, and 
whether we can attribute these differences to differences in the institutional arrangements. 
Comparing outcomes from two processes on a given policy allows us to "hold constant" 
issue content and political context, and to isolate the effects institutionals. 
Table 1 shows the propositions which were considered in both the legislative and di­
rect ballot processes at the statewide level in California between 1974 and 1990, and the 
1 By direct ballot, 've n1ean direct citizen voting on public policy propositions through the initiative 
or referendum. See Magleby, 1984. 
2We expect there to be son1e differences in the types of 1neasures generally considered in the legislative 
and direct ballot processes, especially in ter1ns of the subject area and content of the measures, whose 
interests are represented, etc .. The current research is concerned \Vith ho\v the t\vo processes produce 
different outco1nes on a given poiicy, and so \Vhiie questions about 'vhat gets on the agenda define our 
set of relevant cases, this agenda-setting process in treated as exogenous. 
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policy outcomes from each process.3 In 65 of the 194 cases considered, the legislative 
and direct ballot processes, if operating separately, would have led to different policy 
outcomes on identical (or very similar) measures in an identical political environment.4 
To restate the empirical question, can we attribute differences in policy outcomes, espe­
cially in the off-diagonal cells of Table 1, to differences in the institutional arrangements 
which characterize the two processes? More generally, can we compare the effects of the 
institutional structures defining the legislative process and the direct ballot process to 
enrich our understanding of how political institutions influence policy? 
Table 1 
Number of Statewide Ballot Measures Considered by Both the 




Passed 88 35 
Legislative Outcome 
Failed 30 41 
Data: All measures considered by both the California State Legislature and on the statewide
ballot. Excludes bond measures and measures not brought before the legislature. 
To compare legislative and direct ballot outcomes, we posit two alternative models 
of legislative behavior that provide the framework for testing hypotheses about prefer­
. ence....aggi:egation ancl_policy_o.u.tcomes ..•.. The .. first.js .. a. .. very .. simple .. model of legislative 
3The data for this analysis are fro1n California state\vi<le elections. 25 other states also have provisions 
for direct legislation, and so our analysis and conclusions are applicable to those states as well. 
4In cases of legislative constitutional an1encl111ents, legislative sponsored initiatives, referendums, and 
bonds, the 1neasures considered by the legislature and the electorate are necessarily identical. In cases 
of initiatives introduced in response to failed legislation, the 1neasure introduced as the initiative is often 
slightly different fro1n the original 111easure considered by the legislature. 
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behavior in which representatives respond only to the constraints placed on them by the 
constituents in their districts. This behavior is analogous to the behavior of re-election 
oriented legislators in spatial voting models who are only concerned with how voters will 
react to their legislative decisions (Downs 1957, Mayhew 1974). These spatial voting 
models suggest that as long as representatives are only concerned with winning elections 
and thus respond only to voters in their districts, then over a single dimension, represen­
tatives will choose the policy position of the median voter in their district. Empirically, 
this translates into a vote in accordance with the district majority preference when voters 
are expressing a binary choice. We can call this a delegate model of legislative behavior 
because the representatives behave as perfect delegates to the majority of voters their 
districts. 
The behavior described by this model results in the same outcomes we would expect 
if citizens voted directly for policy and a simple majority rule dictated the process of 
preference aggregation. The primary difference between this simple legislative model and 
the direct ballot process is that according to the model, voters are grouped into districts 
and elect their delegate, whereas in direct legislation they vote at large. At the district 
level, however, the outcomes resulting from the legislative process under this model are 
identical to the policy outcomes resulting from a simple majority rule aggregation of 
voter's preferences. 
The second model of legislative behavior is a richer model which allows representatives 
to have multiple goals and preferences, and in which they respond to the incentives and 
constraints introduced by the legislative institution. Thus, rather than simply being 
interested in re-election and therefore responding only to voters, representatives under 
the second model can also be interested in power and position within the legislature, 
policy outcomes, legislative coalitions, etc. (Fenno 1973) .  To the extent that legislative 
institutions are important, we expect the behavior of the representative to diverge from 
that of the simple delegate actor in systematic ways. In other words, the effects of district 
preferences on legislative behavior become relatively less important as other influences 
act upon the legislator and move his or her vote away from the district mean or median. 
According to this institutional model, we predict that legislators will pick policy positions 
which diverge systematically from the median position in their district. To the extent that 
this model captures the essential elements of legislative behavior, we expect legislative 
outcomes and direct ballot outcomes to be different. 
We know from a vast body of theoretical and empirical evidence that the institutional 
model is the better ·desfrij)tive moder·af!egislativebehavior, ·that legislative institutions 
do affect behavior in systematic ways. The question is, how far can we go towards 
explaining outcomes with the delegate model, and how much better does the institutional 
model perform? To the extent that the institutional model explains differences in the 
aggregate policy outcomes, testing this model allows us to estimate how much difference 
in policy outcomes we can attribute to differences in the institutional structures. 
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2 Model Specification and Estimation Procedures 
To test these alternative models, we estimate an empirical model of legislative roll call 
voting behavior explicitly including in the model a measure of direct ballot outcomes in 
the form of district level ballot returns.5 The empirical analysis consists of two parts. The 
first is an analysis of legislative behavior in which the dependent variable is a legislator's 
roll call vote, and .the-i.ndependent-¥ai:iables are the constituency.preference on the issue, 
measured as the district ballot return, features of the legislature such as committee and 
party, and campaign contributions. To the degree that district preferences are important 
in affecting legislative outcomes, we expect legislative and direct ballot outcomes to 
coincide. 
The second part of the analysis attempts to reconcile legislative and direct ballot 
outcomes as a function of the legislative process. Using the coefficients estimated in the 
first step, we predict the probability of each legislator favoring the measure in the ab­
sence and in the presence of legislative institutions, and then compare those probabilities 
with actual votes. To the degree that the institutional model better predicts aggregate 
outcomes, we can estimate how legislative institutions are important in shaping those 
outcomes. 
2.1 Individual Level Analysis 
The first part of the empirical analysis is an individual level model of legislative behav­
ior in which the roll call vote a legislator casts on a given issue, v;, is specified as a 
function of a vector of constituency characteristics, CON ST;, features of the legislature 
including a vector of party system characteristics, P ART17; and a vector of committee 
system characteristics, COA1.M;, the net campaign contributions, MONEY;, received by 
legislator i relevant to the current measure,6 and an error term, U;. The specification of 
this model is represented in Equation 1 below. 7 A full description of the variables used 
5The district level ballot return serves t'vo functions in the analysis. First, it serves as our measure of 
constituency preferences in the model of legislative roll call voting (Deacon and Shapiro, 1975; Kuklinski, 
1978; Snyder, 1991). Second, it provides the baseline to test our hypotheses about the role of institutions 
in the aggregation process. 
6Hall and Way1nan 1990 sggge_st tha_t Ie.gislators n1ay receive __ contributions from _either supporters, 
opponents, or both. Thus, net contributions are those contributions fro1n groups in favor of the measure 
1ninus contributions fro1n groups opposed. 
711any theories of legislative behavior suggest that the ca1npaign contributions a legislator receives 
and the roll call votes she casts should be treated as jointly deter1nined and therefore esthnated as 
included endogenous variables in a siinultaneous syste1n of equations. Most e1npirical analyses, however, 
find little evidence of endogeneity (see Chappell, 1982; Welch, 1982; Wright, 1985; Evans, 1986; Keim 
and Zardkoochi, 1988; Grenzke, 1989; and Hall and Wayman, 1990), with a few exceptions found in the 
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in the empirical analysis is found in Appendix A. 
2.2 Aggregate Level Analysis 
The second part of the empirical analysis attempts to reconcile the aggregate legislative 
and direct ballot outcomes as a function of the legislative process. We begin with the 
simple delegate model of legislative behavior in which representatives are only influenced 
by their districts' preferences. The percent in the district in favor of the measure, as 
indicated by the district ballot return, is taken as the initial probability of the delegate 
style representative voting "yes" on the measure, in the absence of other pressures. Thus, 
for example, if 553 of the voters in the district voted in favor of the measure, then the 
initial probability of the legislator from that district also voting "yes" on the measure is 
0.55.8 
For each legislator, we adjust the initial probabilities of voting in favor of the mea­
sure to reflect the influences of the legislature as estimated in Equation 1 .  For example, 
suppose we estimate the effect of campaign contributions on the probability of voting 
in favor of the measure as 0.4 in the first step. For each legislator, we multiply the 
contributions they receive by the coefficient of 0.4. This procedure is repeated for all of 
the estimated effects, and then the numbers are summed and converted back into prob­
abilities making some (standard) assumptions about the distribution of the error term. 
If we assume that the underlying probabilities are normally distributed, the probability 
associated with each legislator's Z score (the sum of the estimated effects) is the area 
under the cumulative normal curve from -oo to Z.
We can then assess the effects of these institutional factors in the aggregate by com­
paring the adjusted probabilities of legislators voting in favor of the measure with their 
actual roll calls. The question is, how well does the delegate model predict roll call votes? 
Under the null hypothesis in which legislative institutions are unimportant, we expect 
works of Frendries, 1985; Saltzman, 1987; Wilhite and Thielman, 1987; and Wilhite, 1988. Estimating 
the current models treating n1oney and votes as jointly detern1ined produces inconclusive evidence for 
rejecting the hypothesis that the two are in<lependent1 and so the siinple, single regression model is used
11-. 
-
80ther functional forn1s are possible to describe the relationship bet,veen district ballot return and 
the initial probability of the legislator favoring the 1neasure. For example, 've could imagine a non-linear 
relationship in which changes in district support at the extre1nes have very little effect on the probability 
of the legislator supporting the 1neasure, 'vhile changes in levels of district support around the 50% point 
change the probability of voting substantially. Si1nilarly, one could iinagine the relationship as a step 
function in which the probability of the legislator ,�oting in favor is zero in some ranges of district opinion, 
positive but lo'v in other ranges of district opinion, positive and higher in other ranges, and so on. 
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the delegate model to predict roll calls quite well and for the addition of institutional ef­
fects leave our predictions largely unchanged. Under the alternative hypothesis in which 
institutions do matter, we expect the delegate model to predict quite poorly and for the 
addition of the institutional effects to make a substantial difference. 
3 Empirical Analysis 
We estimate the model of legislative behavior using data from two policy measures which 
were considered in both the California legislature and the California electorate, and 
for which the two processes led to different policy outcomes.9 The first is a cigarette 
tax increase introduced in 1983 and rejected by the legislature as SB161 and then re­
introduced and passed as a citizen sponsored initiative, Proposition 99, in November 
1988. The second case is a transportation bond, approved by the legislature in 1988 as 
SB140 and ultimately rejected by voters as Proposition 74 in June 1988. 
3.1 Cigarette Tax 
The first case we examine is a cigarette tax measure, defeated in the California State 
Senate in 1984 as SB161 ,  reintroduced and passed as an initiative, Proposition 99, in 
November 1988. SB161 was introduced by Democratic Senator Alan Robbins (D-Los 
Angeles) in 1983. The bill called for a 5 cent increase per pack of cigarettes. Other 
salient provisions of the measure included: (1)  reducing the amount of cigarette tax 
revenues distributed to counties and cities from 30% to 20%; (2) imposing an excise 
tax on wholesalers of tobacco products in the amount of 10% of the wholesale price of 
the product; (3) appropriating $135 million from the General Fund to the University of 
California. 
SB161 was co-authored by seven Democratic Senators and seven Democratic Assem­
bly Members and was initially supported in the Senate by the Democratic leadership. 
Initial legislative opposition came from Senate Republicans. Corporate interests were 
also involved in the legislative phase, with the health industry aligning and lobbying in 
favor of the bill, and the tobacco industry lobbying against. The measure received a 
majority vote in the Senate but not the necessary 2/3 supermajority vote necessary to 
pass revenue measures as stipulated in the state constitution. Another measure, ACA14, 
was introduced in the Assen1bly in 1987 and was defeatec(in committee.
9By selecting cases for 'vhich the t'vo processes led to different outco1nes, we are considering only 
two of the four possible outcon1e cornbinations (see Table 1). Ho,vever, \Ve are interested primarily in 
differences between legislative and direct ballot outcomes at the district level, \vhich are likely to occur 
in any of the four types of cases. 
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In 1988, a coalition of health industry groups, citizens groups and legislators under the 
aegis of "Coalition for a Healthy California" 10 introduced Proposition 99, the Cigarette 
and Tobacco Tax. Proposition 99 proposed a 25 cent increase in the tax on a pack 
of cigarettes, plus additional taxes on other tobacco products. These revenues were 
earmarked for spending on health related programs, including health education, hospital 
services, physician services, research, and public resources. The ballot campaign in favor 
of the measure, financed primarily by the health industry, framed Proposition 99 as a 
health care issue, and spent about $1.6 million over the course of the campaign. 
The tobacco industry countered with a costly and controversial campaign of its own. 
Spending over $21 million on the campaign, the tobacco industry tried to frame the 
cigarette tax increase as a crime issue, arguing that higher cigarette taxes in California 
would lead to smuggling of cigarettes from other states and to an increase in gang activity 
and other crime. Proposition 99 passed by a 57.83 majority on the November 1988 ballot. 
The main problems with using the cigarette tax case to compare legislative and direct 
ballot policy outcomes are the 4 year gap between the two votes and differences in the 
wording of the legislative and direct ballot measures. The time gap introduces problems of 
inference associated with attributing differences in outcomes to differences in institutional 
processes. The research design requires that, in order to isolate the institutional effects, 
other possible influences on either legislative or voting behavior must remain constant. 
However, as more time passes between the two votes, the possibility that other factors 
such as preferences or the institutions themselves are also changing becomes greater. 
The second problem is that the wording of the measures considered by legislators and 
the electorate were quite different. This raises the possibility that while both measures 
were concerned with raising the tobacco taxes, legislators might have perceived the mea­
sure quite differently than the electorate perceived it, and so the behavior they exhibited 
might have been evoked by different preferences and evaluations. 
These problems are offaet in two ways. First, other features of the cigarette tax case 
make it a particularly good case to use, especially that the measure was highly salient 
and well publicized, meaning that we expect citizen preferences to be relatively well 
informed. This is important because we require both representatives and contributors 
to anticipate the district ballot vote, and this becomes a more reasonable assumption 
when preferences are better defined. Second, several of the problems with the case are 
balanced in the selection of the second case which is described later. 
10The executive com1nittee of the Coalition included the American Cancer Society, the American
Heart Association, the A1nerican Lung Association, the California Association of Hospitals and Health 
Systems, the california Medical Association, Can1paign California, the Planning and conservation League, 
and Assemblyman Lloyd Connelly (D-Sacramento ) . 
7 
3.1.1  Results 
Empirical results from the estimation of Equation 1 for the cigarette tax case are pre­
sented in Tables 2 through 4. Table 2 reports the structural coefficients and standard 
errors for the model of legislative behavior. Since the estimates in Table 2 are probit 
estimates and are therefore difficult to interpret, I present in Table 3 illustrative values of 
several explanatory variables and the probabilities of voting in favor of SB161 associated 
with those values. Table 4 reports the analysis of aggregate outcomes. 
Model of Legislative Behavior 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report the structural coefficients and standard errors, re­
spectively, for the roll call votes equation. We find that legislators responded to a variety 
of constituency and institutional pressures. District preference had a positive influence 
on roll call votes, with legislators from districts with a majority of voters in favor of the 
measure exhibiting a higher probability of voting in favor on the roll call. Salience of the 
issue in the district, measured as the ballot dropoff between the presidential race and 
Proposition 99, is also signed as predicted. The more the ballot dropoff, and thus the 
lower the salience of the ballot measure, the less constrained was the legislator in the 
direction of his or her district's preferenceu 
(Insert Table 2 Here) 
Institutional position also influenced how a legislator voted on the bill. Members of 
the Revenue & Tax and Finance committees were less likely to cast a "yes" vote than 
their counterparts off the committees. Members on the Health & Welfare committee 
were more likely to vote in favor of the measure. Since the committee variables in this 
equation include a dummy variable for membership on the committee, times a party 
variable scored 1 for Democrats, 0 for Independents, and -1 for Republicans, we are able 
to test the differential impacts of committee position on Democratic and Republican 
committee members. As predicted, the interactive effect is evident, suggesting that the 
role of committee leadership partially replaces the role of party leadership and members 
of committees look more like other members of the committee and less like members of 
their party off the committee. Committee leadership moved Revenue & Tax and Finance 
members away from the mean position of their partisan counterparts off the committee, 
. and-H€k'tlth-&-v¥@lfare-leadership0reinforced -the-position-of-partisan -leaders and moved 
members towards their mean partisan positions. 
1 1This assun1es that the salience of the presidential race \Vas constant across districts, and that varia­
tions in drop off can be attribu te<l to differences in the salience of Proposition 99, and not the presidential 
race, across districts. We multiply dropoff by a du1nn1y variable scored 1 if a majority of the district 
favored the measure and -1 if a inajority opposed to capture the direction of constraint. 
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This is not to say, however, that partisanship was unimportant in influencing votes, 
and in fact we find that Democrats were much more likely than Republicans to vote in 
favor of the measure. This effect is large and statistically significant. 
F inally, we find campaign contributions from relevant donors are positively but not 
significantly related to roll call votes. 
Since the dependent variable in the legislative behavior model is dichotomous, the 
coefficients are probit estimates, a11d so the mag1iitudes of their effects are difficult to 
interpret and depend on the values of the other explanatory variables. Thus, we include 
Table 3 ,  which shows illustrative values of some of the independent variables and the 
effects of changes in those variables on the probability of legislators voting in favor of 
the measure. The first column of Table 3 shows district preferences varying from 45 
to 55 to 653. Column 2 shows several levels of campaign contributions. Column 3 
shows partisanship, with Republicans scored 0 and Democrats scored 1 .  Z, in the fourth 
column, is the sum of the effects of district preferences, legislator's partisanship, and 
contributions received as described in that row, plus the effects of the other explanatory 
variables set at their sample means. Column 5 then shows those Z scores re-converted 
to probabilities assuming an underlying normal distribution. Reading across the first 
row, we take district preferences as 453 in favor, in a district in which a Republican 
Senator received $10,000 in relevant contributions. The probability of a Senator in such 
circumstances voting in favor of the measure is 0.0000. Similarly, reading across the last 
row, a Democratic Senator whose district voted in 653 in favor of Prop 99 and who 
received $45,000 in contributions has a 0.9999 probability of voting for SB161 .  
(Insert Table 3 Here) 
Several points are relevant. First, partisan differences are great. Democrats at nearly 
all levels of district constraint and interest group pressure have a greater than .5 prob­
ability of voting in favor of the measure, while Republicans from nearly all levels of 
constraint and pressure are likely to vote against. And second, to the degree that Re­
publicans do have a greater than .5 probability of voting in favor of the measure, it is only 
those Republicans from districts with high levels of support who receive high campaign 
contributions. Democrats are likely to vote against the measure only at very low levels 
of district support and contributions. 
Comparing Legislative and Direct Ballot Outcomes 
The final step in the empirical analysis is to use the results of the individual level estima­
tion to re-create the collective policy outcomes. As described earlier, we begin with an 
initial probability of each legislator voting in favor of the legislation as the percent in the 
district voting in favor on the corresponding ballot measure. We then adjust the prob­
ability for each legislator to reflect the influences of the legislative institution estimated 
in the individual level analysis. Thus, if the initial probability is .48 and the coefficient 
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on party is positive, for example, we increase the initial probability in a positive direc­
tion. The adjusted probabilities are then compared with actual roll call votes. In a 
completely specified deterministic model, the roll call votes and the adjusted probabili­
ties would match exactly. Discrepancies between the votes and probabilities, then, reflect 
either omitted variables, which can be detected through an analysis of the residuals, or 
stochastic variation. 
Table ·4 pr'°sents the results of·the aggregate analysis. Columns 1 through 3 show
each Senator's district, name, and roll call vote, respectively. Votes are scored 1 if the 
Senator voted in favor of the measure, 0 if she voted against, and are dropped if the 
Senator abstained. 
(Insert Table 4 Here) 
Column 4 shows the percent voting in favor of Proposition 99 in each district. This 
is taken as the initial probability of the legislator voting in favor of the measure. Bold 
faced entries indicate cases in which the actual roll call vote was different from what we 
would expect if the legislator was acting as a pure delegate, legislative institutions were 
unimportant, and the representative responded only to his or her districts' preferences. 
In other words, "missed" cases are those in which the initial probability of voting in favor 
of the measure was above .5 but the legislator voted no, or the initial probability was 
below .5 but the legislator voted yes. As we can see, the delegate model mis-predicts 15 
of the 37 votes. In most of the missed cases, the initial probability was above .5 and the 
legislator voted no. 
Column 5 shows the Z score for each Senator. Z is simply the sum of the estimated 
coefficients times the value of each corresponding variable for each individual, that is, 
Z; = EX;b 
The coefficients estimated in the individual analysis are multiplied by the value of the 
explanatory variables for each legislator, and the sum of all the effects equals Z. Using 
the coefficients reported in Table 2 ,  Z; is calculated as: 
Z; -9.32 + .15(3Yes99) + 3.23(Party) 
""1:21 (Rev aiicrTax ¥1'arty).:. . T17(Fin * Pa1'ty) 
+4. 16(Hlth and Welh Party) - .3l(Dropoff) 
+.16(Money) 
Column 6 shows each Senator's Z score re-converted back into a probability assuming 
a normal distribution of the probabilities. This, then, is the adjusted probability of 
each legislator voting "yes" on the measure, accounting for the effects of the legislative 
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institution, which is simply the area under the cumulative normal curve between -oo and 
Z. Bold faced probabilities represent cases in which the model mis-predicted the actual 
roll call, that is, in which the adjusted probability is above .5 but the Senator voted 
against the measure, or in which the adjusted probability is below .5 but the Senator 
voted in favor. 
As we can see, the model including the legislative effects recreates actual roll calls 
much betterthan·the-0ne-including only constituency-·effects. The foll model only mis­
predicted 7 cases, compared with the 15 missed in the initial model. Examining the cases
which the model mis-predicted, three of the estimated probabilities were above .5 and
the legislator voted against the measure, and four others were below .5 and the legislator
voted in favor. Four of the missed cases were Republicans, three were Democrats. Five
were on committees with jurisdiction, and two were not. In general, there are no obvious
patterns in the missed cases.
3.2 Transportation Bond 
The second case was selected to complement the first case. This case is a transportation 
bond measure, introduced and passed as SB140, 1988, and then defeated in the electorate 
as Proposition 74, Nov 1988. 
SB140 was introduced in the State Senate by vVadie Deddeh, Democrat from San 
Diego and member of the Transportation Committee. The measure authorized the state 
to issue $1 billion in General Obligation Bonds to be used to supplement federal, state, 
and local revenues already committed to capital improvements on state highways, local 
streets and roads, and rail transit. Initial supporters in the Senate included members 
from urban districts. Opposition in the State Legislature was weak, unorganized, and 
insubstantial. The measure was referred to Appropriations in the Senate, passed 27 to 
7 on a floor roll call, and was subsequently referred to Ways & Means in the Assembly 
and passed 54 to 14. 
When the measure was passed on to the electorate as Proposition 7 4, endorsements 
came from Governor Deukmejian, who personally contributed $19,000 to the ballot cam­
paign in support of Proposition 74, and loaned the campaign an additional $280,000. 
$332,025 was spent on the ballot campaign, with contributions coming primarily from 
the transportation, construction, oil and gas, and financial industries. Early survey evi-
.. dence-sh0w.ed-that.Gal.if0rnians.supp0rteclthe .. measure.by�margin of 643 to 273 with 
93 undecided in April 1988 (The California Poll, #1437, April 21 ,  1988). On election 
day, the measure failed in the electorate by a very slim margin. 
The transportation bond provides an excellent second case with which to test our 
hypotheses about the effects of legislative institutions. In the transportation bond case, 
1 1  
the two versions of the measure were worded identically.12 In addition, the two votes
occurred in close proximity, with SB140 approved in the legislature on March 14, 1 988 
and the measure considered by voters on June 7, 1988, less than 3 months later. To the 
degree that the cigarette tax provides a weakened test of the hypotheses because of the 
differences in question wording and time gap between the two votes, the transportation 
bond compensates on those dimensions. 
The main-wealmess w�th -the -transportation bond case is that the measure was less 
publicized, and so we need to worry about how well formed and stable were citizen 
preferences towards the measure. In order for the legislative delegate model to work in 
the real world, representatives must be able to estimate their districts' preferences (and 
thus their votes) long in advance of the ballot vote. From the survey evidence, it is clear 
that preferences changed a lot over the course of the ballot campaign. For legislators 
to act as delegates of their constituents, they need to anticipate this change, and this 
becomes more difficult if preferences are highly labile. 
3.2.1 Results 
Tables 5 through 7 present the results of the estimation of Equation 1 for the transporta­
tion bond case. Table 5 reports estimates of the individual model of legislative behavior 
for the State Assembly vote on SB140.13 Table 6 presents illustrative values of several 
explanatory variables and the predicted probabilities of legislators voting favorably on 
SB140 associated with those values. Table 7 presents the aggregate analysis of policy 
outcomes. 
Model of Legislative Behavior 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the structural estimates and standard errors for the 
roll call votes model. District preferences towards the measure are strongly and positively 
related to the probability of the legislator voting in favor on the roll call. This suggests 
that legislators were constrained by their districts' preferences and tended to vote with 
their district's majority. In addition, other constraints imposed on legislators by their 
constituencies were also important in influencing roll call votes, especially issue salience. 
Members from districts with high levels of dropoff, and thus low issue salience, were less 
constrained by their districts and were thus less likely to vote in the direction of their 
district's majority preference. Legislators from high salience (low dropoff) districts were 
more "likely to vote with "their clisti'icts. 
(Insert Table 5 Here) 
12This must necessarily be the case \Vith all bond 1neasures. 
13 Although the bill was voted on (and passed) in both the State Assembly and Senate, we limit our 
analysis to the Asse1nbly vote. 
12 
Several of the institutional variables also showed some effect on roll call votes. The 
effect of partisanship is negative, with Republicans more likely to vote in favor of the 
bond than Democrats. The standard error on this estimate, however, is very large.14 
Committee position, in particular the interaction between committee membership and 
the legislator's party, also had some effect on how a legislator voted. Members of the Ways 
& Means committee became more like their partisan counterparts off the committee. For 
Democrnts,· this meant -becoming morn opposed to the measure, and for Republicans 
this meant becoming more favorable. Members of the Transportation committee became 
more polarized in the opposite direction of other partisans. Democrats on the committee 
favored the measure more than Democrats off the committee, and Republicans off were 
more opposed than Republicans on. 
Finally, the effect of transportation industry contributions is positive but small and 
not statistically significant. 
Illustrative values and the associated predicted probabilities for the roll call votes 
equation are presented in Table 6. This table is interpreted in the same way as Table 
3 for the cigarette tax case. For Democrats, low district support for the measure at all 
levels of contributions led to a predicted probability of favoring the measure of less than 
.5. Similarly, high district support at all levels of contributions led to a probability of 
favoring the measure of well above .5. 
(Insert Table 6 Here) 
For Republicans, all combinations of district preferences and campaign contributions 
lead to a predicted probability of the legislator voting in favor of SB140, and in fact, all 
of the Assembly Republicans did vote in favor of the measure (or abstain) on the actual 
roll call. 
Comparing Legislative and Direct Ballot Outcomes 
Finally, as with the cigarette tax case, the estimates from the individual model of leg­
islative behavior are used to test hypotheses about the relationship between legislative 
and direct ballot outcomes and to further explore the predictive powers of the delegate 
and institutional models of legislative behavior. 
--{Inser,t .Table .. 'f-Jlere�
For each district, Table 7 lists the legislator's district, name, roll call vote, district 
majority preference, Z score, and adjusted probability. As in the previous analysis, we 
14Since all of the Republicans voted yes on the transportation bond and De1nocrats split 22 in favor 
and 14 opposed, a legislator's party is au excellent predictor of votes for Republicans but a rather poor 
predictor of votes for Democrats. 
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use the percent favoring ballot Proposition 74 as an estimate of the initial probability that 
a legislator will also vote in favor of the measure. We then adjust the initial probabilities 
to account for the effects of institutional factors on individual legislative behavior as 
estimated in the individual level model. These adjusted probabilities are then compared 
to the roll call votes, and matches between district majority preferences and roll call votes 
are noted. To the degree that the adjusted probabilities, reflecting institutional effects, 
better predict actual behavior, then this stands as empirical evidence for the institutional 
model of legislative behavior and for the prediction that the legislative and direct ballot 
processes lead to different policy outcomes. 
Column 3 of Table 7 shows each legislator's roll call vote, with votes in favor scored 
1 and votes against scored 0. Abstentions are noted as ( . ) .  Column 4 shows the percent 
in each district voting in favor of Proposition 7 4. Bold faced entries are those in which 
the roll call vote and the majority preference diverged. 27 out of 68 districts were mis­
predicted. All but 4 were districts in which the majority preference was against the 
measure and the legislator voted in favor. 
Column 6 shows the adjusted probabilities reflecting the institutional effects estimated 
in the individual model. This model predicts roll calls remarkably well. Only 8 cases are 
mis-predicted, with 4 predicting a negative vote when a positive one occurred, and the 
other 4 mis-predicting positive votes. All 8 missed cases were Democrats. The conclusions 
which flow naturally from this analysis are that while there is considerable support for a 
delegate model of legislative behavior in the estimated effects of district preferences on 
roll call votes, institutional effects are also important, and it is these institutional effects 
which lead legislative outcomes away from direct ballot outcomes. 
3.3 Comparisons between the Two Cases 
We can compare the estimates from the two cases to begin generalizing about the deter­
minants of legislative behavior and the importance of legislative institutions on shaping 
outcomes. In both cases, the effect of district preference is strong and positive in both 
cases. Vve can conclude from the importance of this effect that legislators in American 
democratic government, or in the California state legislature at least, are responsive to 
the preferences of their constituencies and behave in a way consistent with the delegate 
model of representation. Other factors are found to affect behavior as well, but the 
influence of district preferences is powerful and important. 
Patterns of effect and significance for the other variables are remarkably similar across 
the two cases as well. The effects of issue salience, committee positions, partisanship, 
and contributions on legislative behavior are in the directions we expect and are of about 
the same magnitude and level of significance in the two cases. The standard error on the 
coefficient for partisanship is much larger in the transportation bond case than in the 
cigarette tax case, but this is probably because of the unusual distribution of the variable 
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itself - no Republicans voted in favor of the measure, so we only have variance in voting 
behavior for Democrats - rather than the importance of the effect. 
4 Conclusions 
We are.now.fo.a.better-position to draw eonclusions about.the linkages between district 
preferences and legislative behavior. The primary inference we make from the individual 
level analysis is that district preferences are clearly an important component of legislative 
decision making. Analysis of the empirical results shows that district preferences are 
strongly related to roll call voting behavior, that legislators respond to the constraints 
imposed on them by voters in their districts. This serves as at least partial evidence 
for a delegate theory of legislative behavior in which the preferences of voters and the 
behavior of their representatives are closely linked. 
The degree of constituency constraint a legislator faces depends on both the size of 
the majority in their district and the level of salience of the issue. The size of the majority 
determines how much support legislators are likely to find in the electorate depending on 
how they vote. If there is a large majority in favor of the measure, and if the legislator 
votes against her district's majority preference, then assuming voters care enough about 
the measure to make it an important election issue, the legislator is left with only a few 
supporters. If the district is evenly split on the measure, with a small majority and a 
relatively large minority, then whichever way she votes, the legislator will find a large 
group of support and so is less constrained.15 
Salience is important in determining how strongly voters feel about the issue, and how 
much effort they are willing to exert to express their preferences and presumably how 
much they are willing to exert to enforce favorable behavior by their representatives. 
When an issue is highly salient, legislators take greater notice of their constituent's 
preferences and are more constrained by the district majority. If the issue is of low 
salience, legislators are less constrained and have more flexibility to respond to other 
considerations. 
Even though district preferences serve as important constraints on legislative behav­
ior, this is not to say that legislators act as perfect delegates, that they represent their 
districts' preferences as the voters would represent themselves. In fact, the empirical 
analysis suggests that party institutions in the legislature have an important indepen­
dent influence on a legislator's voting decisions and serve to move legislative behavior 
away from the median preferences within each legislator's district. Several theories ex­
plain the possible mechanisms through which influences of the party system are translated 
into constraints upon legislative behavior, and include the influences of other like-minded 
15This argu1nent is si1nilar to Fiorina1s (1974) discussion of constituency conflict and consensus.
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partisans and especially party leaders. Partisan influences and the position of party lead­
ers can either reinforce or conflict with constituency influences in shaping a legislator's 
behavior, depending on the direction of each influence. When a legislator's district and 
party leadership concur on an issue, legislators should feel strongly constrained to vote 
in that direction. When the district majority and party leadership take opposite sides of 
an issue, the relative influence of each will determine how the legislator votes. 
Other-institu.tional-influences-.are important in moving legislators away from their 
district majority or median preferences as well, especially committee position. The theory 
of committee influences offered here is that, like party leaders, committee leaders have 
resources they use to influence their members and so can move legislators in the direction 
of their own preferences. Again, the influence of committee leaders will in some cases be 
in conjunction with and in other cases in conflict with the preferences of party leaders 
and the district majority. 
4.1 Linking the Legislative and Direct Ballot Processes 
From the aggregate level analysis, we are able to draw conclusions about the linkages 
between the direct ballot process and the legislative process. \Ive found that although dis­
trict preferences are strongly related to legislative behavior, a model of policy outcomes 
which attempts to predict outcomes as a function of constituency constraints alone per­
forms quite poorly. On a district-by-district basis, the delegate model mis-predicts nearly 
half of the legislative votes for both the cigarette tax and the transportation bond. In 
other words, only half of the legislators behaved in such a way that the policy outcomes 
they would have produced matched the comparable policy outcomes their districts them­
selves would have produced. 
On an aggregate basis, the delegate model also mis-predicts the policy outcome for 
both cases. For the cigarette tax case, legislators voting with their districts would have 
passed the measure which they in reality voted down, and for the transportation bond 
case, legislators voting with their districts would have tied half in favor and half against, 
and so the ultimate policy outcome would have depended on the rules for breaking ties 
in the particular institutional setting. 
Adding the effects of features of the legislative institution improves the aggregate 
model and our ability to predict outcomes. 
4.2 Motivating Questions 
This analysis began with the following motivation question: do legislative institutions 
lead to different outcomes than direct ballot institutions? The empirical analyses and es­
pecially the analysis of aggregate policy outcomes suggests that, indeed, the two processes 
lead to different outcomes for a given issue and a given distribution of voter preferences. 
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We expect the direct ballot process to produce outcomes in line with the median of voter 
preferences. This might not be the same as the median of all citizen preferences, given 
differential turnout and preferences across different types of voters, but it is a predictable 
outcome which is consistent with the norms of democratic theory. 
Our expectations about the nature of outcomes the legislative process produces are 
less precise. We know that strict delegate legislators will vote in line with the median 
preference in ·t·heir·district; and as·long·as·legislator's preferences are aggregated according 
to simple majority rule, the policies produced will approximate the median of the district 
medians. Our analysis strongly suggests, however, that the delegate model only captures 
some of the important elements of actual legislative behavior, and that in fact, legislative 
institutions move policy outcomes systematically away from the median of the district 
medians. The net effect of these institutions will depend on the amount of constraint faced 
by the legislator and her ability to respond to the incentives provided by the legislative 
institution. 
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5 Appendix A 
The following section describes the data used to estimate the model of legislative behav­
ior and test the hypotheses about the relationship between legislative and direct ballot 
outcomes for the cigarette tax and transportation bond cases. These include the variables 
used to operationalize the estimation of Equation 1 .  
5.1 Cigarette Tax 
The dependent variable in the roll call votes equation, v,;, is measured as the roll call 
vote of Senator i on the Senate roll call vote on SB161 taken on May 19, 1983. This is 
the partial observation of Senator i's preferences for the cigarette tax policy, Vii· Votes 
in favor of the measure are scored 1 ,  votes opposed to the measure are scored 0, and 
abstentions are dropped. The results of that roll call were 22 in favor, 15 opposed. 
Constituency effects are measured with two variables. Yes99 is the percent of voters 
in district i voting in favor of Proposition 99. This provides both the measure of district 
preferences for the cigarette tax, and also forms the basis to compare the delegate and 
institutional models of legislative behavior. In order to make the hypothesis tests between 
the two models, we include this variable untransformed.16 We expect legislators from
districts with a large percentage in favor of the measure to be highly constrained and to 
also vote in favor on the roll call, for those with a small majority in favor to be constrained 
to vote in favor but with a lower probability, for those with a small majority opposed to 
be weakly constrained to vote against the measure on the roll call, and so on. 
The second district preference variable is Dropoff, intended to capture the salience 
of Proposition 99 in the district. Drop off is measured as the percent difference between 
the number of voters in district i who cast a vote on the presidential race, the lead race 
on the ballot, and the number who cast a vote on Proposition 99. This percentage is 
multiplied by 1 if the majority of the district was in favor of the measure and by -1 if the 
district was majority opposed. The interpretation of this interaction is that legislators 
from districts in which the measure is highly salient and a majority favors will be highly 
constrained to vote in favor, legislators from districts in which the measure is highly 
salient and a majority opposes will be highly constrained to vote against, and so on. 
In addition to constituency effects, variables intended to measure the effects of features 
of the·legisla:tme are also illcohided in 'the ·toll call votes'eqilati01L'·These include features
of the party system and the committee system. Effects of the party system relevant to
16To test \Vhether this linear specification is a good approxiination of the actual relationship revealed
in the data, we estimated the n1odel 'vi th several other functional for1ns of the district preference variable 
to capture any possible non-linear effects bet,veen district preferences and roll call votes. 'Ve found that 
the relationship was 'vell represented as a linear function, and so for sin1plicity and to facilitate the 
hypothesis tests, we include the district preference variable untransfor1ne<l. 
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the legislator's vote are measured as his or her partisanship, Party. Party is scored 1 for 
Democrats and -1 for Republicans. Independents were dropped. In the 1983-1984 session 
of the California Senate, there were 25 Democrats, 14 Republicans, and 1 Independent. 
This variable is intended to capture both the influences of party leadership on party 
rank and file roll call votes, and also differences in ideology and policy preferences held 
by Democrats and Republicans. In the cigarette tax case, the Democratic legislative 
leadership favored the measure and the Republican leadership opposed it. Add to this 
the general pro-tax preferences of Democrats and the anti- tax preferences of Republicans, 
and we can expect Democrats to be more in favor of the tax increase and Republicans 
to be more opposed. 
Committee system effects, and especially the influence of committee leadership on 
committee members are picked up as dummy variables for the legislators' committee 
memberships. Rev&Tax* is an interaction term between a dummy variable indicat­
ing whether the Senator was a member of the Revenue and Tax committee, which had 
jurisdiction over SB161,  times a partisanship variable scored 1 for Democrats and -1 
for Republicans. This interaction allows us to estimate the differential influences of the 
Democratic and Republican leaders on committee members from their respective par­
ties. Thinking about committee membership as resembling a game with repeated play, 
we expect committee members to look more like others on the committee and less like 
their partisan counterparts off the committee. Thus, we expect Democratic commit­
tee members to be less favorable towards the cigarette tax and Republican committee 
members to be less opposed. Finance* is an interaction between a variable indicating 
membership on the Senate Finance committee, which also considered the bill, and the 
partisanship variable, as scored above. Hlth&Welf' is an interaction between a variable 
indicating membership on the Health and Welfare committee, which while not having 
jurisdiction over the bill can be expected to contain members with strong and perhaps 
atypical preferences over cigarette tax legislation, times the partisanship variable. 
The effects of the system of campaign finance on legislative roll call votes are picked 
up through the effects of contributions received under that system. Money measures 
the net campaign contributions received by legislator i from groups in favor of SB161 and 
Proposition 99, minus those from groups opposed to the cigarette tax measures, in their 
most recent election. For Senators in odd numbered districts, these were contributions 
collected during the 1982 primary and general election campaigns, while for Senators in 
even numbered districts, these include contributions collected during the 1980 primary 
-.and -g.eneral..JJ.l""ti�n...Gan:1paigns....ContFibutions . .in favor.irn•lude-those.from all identified 
health industry groups, organizations, or individuals, plus other contributors identified 
as having an obvious or a revealed interest in the measure, especially those who con­
tributed to the Proposition 99 ballot campaign. Contributions opposed include those 
from tobacco industry groups or corporation, plus contributions from others identified as 
having an obvious or revealed interest, especially those who contributed to the anti-Prop 
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99 campaign. Most of these contributions were from health industry contributors H 
5 . 2  Transportation Bond 
The data used to estimate Equation 1 for the transportation bond case are as follows. 
The dependent variable in the roll call votes equation is the vote cast by Assembly 
member i on -SB140, taken oi1 Mar'Ch 7, 1988. As in the cigarette tax case, the vote we 
observe, v,;, is taken as a partial observation of the legislator's underlying preference for 
the transportation bond, Vii· Votes in favor of the measure are scored 1 ,  votes against 
are scored 0, and abstentions are dropped. The Assembly roll call was 54 in favor, 14 
opposed, and 12 abstentions. 
Constituency effects are measured with two variables, district preference for the mea­
sure and salience in the district. Y es7 4 is the percent in district i voting in favor of 
Proposition 74, November 1988. This is intended to measure the level of support for the 
measure in the district, and thus the nature of constraint on the legislator from his or her 
district . To facilitate hypothesis tests between the delegate and institutional legislative 
behavior models, as with the cigarette tax case, this variable is included untransformed. 
The second constituency constraint variable is Dropoff, measured as the percent 
difference between the number of votes cast in district i for the first ballot measure 
listed, in this case Proposition 66, and the measure of interest, Proposition 74. Dropoff 
is intended to measure the salience of the measure in the district, with districts for 
which the measure is highly salient showing less ballot dropoff, and in these districts the 
legislators being more highly constrained. The variable is multiplied by 1 if a majority 
in the district favored the measure and -1 if a majority opposed to capture the correct 
direction of constraint. 
Party system variables are intended to measure the influence of party leadership on 
individual legislators as well as differences in preferences and ideology systematically 
related to partisanship. These effects are captured through each legislator's partisan­
ship, Party, scored 1 for Democrats and -1 for Republicans. Independents are dropped. 
During the 1987-1988 session, the Assembly had 43 Democrats, 36 Republicans and 1 
Independent. Assembly Republican leadership was initially strongly in support of the 
transportation bond, and so we expect Republicans, all else equal, to be more likely to 
favor the measure as well. 
-comniittee system'e!fects, -aw1n the previous case, are operatioi1alized as an interac­
tion between the legislator's committee membership and partisanship. Ways&Means* 
17Contributions fro1n the tobacco industry \Vere very lo\v during this contribution cycle with contribu­
tions ranging from $500 to $2,000 to a half dozen senators. It '\Vas not until the cigarette tax legislation 
was introduced as a ballot 1neasure that the tobacco industry bccan1e 111obilized in the California political 
arena. 
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is an interaction between membership on the Assembly Ways & Means Committee and 
the legislator's partisanship scored 1 for Democrats, 0 for Independents, and - 1  for Repub­
licans. Trans* is an interaction between membership on the Assembly Transportation 
committee and the legislator's partisanship. For both committees, we expect Republicans 
to be less in favor and Democrats to be less opposed than their non-committee partisan 
counterparts. 
Effects -of.the-system--ofcampaign-finance are measured as the contributions the leg­
islator received from that system. Money is the net campaign contributions received 
by legislator i from groups in favor of SB140 and Proposition 74, minus those from 
groups opposed to the transportation bond, in their most recent election. These in­
clude contributions collected during the 1986 primary and general election campaigns. 
Contributions in favor include those from all identified transportation industry groups, 
organizations, or individuals, plus other contributors identified as having an obvious or 
a revealed interest in the measure, especially those who contributed to the Proposition 
74 ballot campaign. Contributions opposed include those from environmental and tax­
payers groups, plus contributions from others identified as having an obvious or revealed 
interest, especially those who contributed to the anti-Prop 74 campaign. Most of the 
contributions were from transportation industry contributors. 
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Table 2 
Model of Legislative Behavior, Cigarette Tax 
Variable Vote SB140 StdErr 
%Yes99 . 1508 ( .0835) 
Dropoff -.3141 (.2188) 
Rev&Tax*Party -1 .2058 (.9420) 
Finance* Party -1 .1682 (.7657) 
Hlth&Welf*Party 4.1553 (21 .7023) 
Party 3.2295 (1 .4535) 
Money .1566 ( .2756) 
Constant -9.3165 ( 4.8413) 
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Table 3 
Model of Legislative Behavior, Illustrative Values and 
Probabilities, Cigarette Tax 
Dist.Pref. Cont rib Party z P(v; = 1 ) 
45 15,000 0 -3.2934 .0000 
55 15,000 0 - 1 .7854 .0371 
65 15,000 0 -.2774 .3907 
45 30,000 0 -3.0585 .00 1 1  
55 30,000 0 -1 .5503 .0605 
65 30,000 0 -.0425 .4831 
45 45,000 0 -2.8236 .0024 
55 45,000 0 -1 .3156 .0942 
65 45,000 0 .1924 .5763 
45 15 ,000 1 - .0639 .4745 
55 15,000 1 1 .4441 .9256 
65 15,000 1 2.9521 .9984 
45 30,000 1 .1710 .5679 
55 30,000 1 1 .6792 .9534 
65 30,000 1 3 .1871 .9993 
45 45,000 1 .4059 .6576 
55 45,000 1 1 .9139 .9722 
65 45,000 1 3.0371 .9988 
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Table 4 
Aggregate Analysis, Cigarette Tax 
District Senator Roll Call P0(v1 = 1 ) z P1(v1 = 1) 
1 Johnson 0 .5294 
2 Keene 1 .5524 2.0355 .9791 
3 Doolittle 0 .6769 -.8842 . 1883 
4 Nilsen 0 .5482 -.7592 .2239 
5 Marks 1 .5170 -.4938 .3107 
6 Greene,L. 1 .5501 1 .8070 .9646 
7 Boatwright 0 .5934 .6639 .7466 
8 Toran 0 .6028 -.3108 .3780 
9 Petris 1 .6806 1 .9585 .9749 
10  Lockyer 1 .5670 .8934 .8142 
1 1  Alquist 1 .6810 1 .0005 .8415 
12 McCorquodale 1 .5722 6.5798 1 .0000 
13 Gararnendi 1 .6074 .2448 .5967 
14 Maddy 0 .5290 -3.6701 .0001 
15  Vuich .5326 1 .5256 .9365 
16 Stiern 1 .4916 .3552 .6388 
17  Mello .5824 6.9639 1 .0000 
18 Hart 1 .6179 2 .1754 .9852 
19 Davis 1 .6250 - . 1358 .4460 
20 Robbins 1 .5902 1 .7994 .9640 
21 Russell 0 .5930 -.8591 .1952 
22 Rosenthal 1 .7319 9.0376 1 .0000 
23 Roberti 1 .6404 2.3604 .9909 
24 Torres 1 .6030 2. 1360 .9837 
25 Richardson .5566 -.2997 .3822 
26 Montoya 1 .5541 6.2158 1 .0000 
27 Beverly 0 .4425 -3.6868 .0001 
28 Watson 1 .5519 6.0484 1.0000 
29 Greene 1 .6313 2.0997 .9821 
30 Dills 1 .5030 -.4093 .3412 
"31 "Speraw 0 :6005 " �"1[5740 .0000 
32 Royce 0 .5271 - .3487 .3637 
33 Campbell 0 .5397 -4.1207 .0000 
34 Ayala 0 .5144 -.2143 .4152 
35 Seymour 0 .5816 .6669 .7476 
36 Presley 0 .5167 .3414 .6336 
37 Carpenter 1 .5918 7.2144 1 .0000 
38 Craven 1 .6187 -.5132 .3039 
39 Ellis 0 .5798 -1 .0607 .1444 
40 Deddeh 1 27 .5234 1 .1559 .8761 
Table 5 
Model of Legislative Behavior, 
Transportation Bond 
Variable Vote Std Err 
3Yes74 . 1674 (.0706) 
Drop off -.2155 ( .1546) 
Vvays&Means*Party -.4727 ( .6367) 
Trans* Party 1.2482 (.9867) 
Party -5.2452 ( 1 1 .6569) 
Money .2811 ( .4321) 
Constant -3.3500 (12.0109) 
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Table 6 
Model of Legislative Behavior, Illustrative Values 
and Probabilities, Transportation Bond 
Dist.Pref Contrib Party z P(v; = 1 ) 
45 10,000 0 3.9358 .9999 
50 10,000 0 5.6098 1 .0000 
55 10,000 0 7.2798 1 .0000 
45 30,000 0 4.4980 1 .0000 
50 30,000 0 6 . 1720 1 .0000 
55 30,000 0 7.8460 1 .0000 
45 50,000 0 5.0602 1 .0000 
50 50,000 0 6.7342 1 .0000 
55 50,000 0 8.4082 1 .0000 
45 10,000 1 -1 .3094 .0952 
50 10,000 1 .3646 .6423 
55 10,000 1 2.0346 .9791 
45 30,000 1 -.7472 .2275 
50 30,000 1 .9268 .8230 
55 30,000 1 2.6008 .9954 
45 50,000 1 - .1850 .4266 
50 50,000 1 1 .4890 .9318 
55 50,000 1 3.1630 .9992 
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Table 7 
Aggregate Analysis, Transportation Bond 
District Member Roll Call P0(v1 = 1) z P1(V1 = 1 ) 
1 Statham 1 .4064 3.7399 .9999 
2 Hauser 1 .4650 - .6787 .2487 
3 Chandler 1 .4068 3.5576 .9998 
4 Hannigan 1 .5440 .3479 .6360 
5 Leslie 1 .5035 5.9072 1 .0000 
6 Connelly 0 .5031 .0967 .5385 
7 Waters, N. 1 .4521 -.7833 .2167 
8 Hansen 1 .5257 4.4517 1 .0000 
9 Filante 1 .5356 5.9074 1 .0000 
10  Isenberg 1 .5125 - .1441 .4427 
1 1 Campbell 1 .6091 2.0351 .9791 
12  Bates 0 .5180 .0236 .5094 
13 Harris 0 .4383 - .1425 .4434 
14  Klehs 1 .4587 - .9448 .1724 
15  Baker 1 .5954 7.6136 1 .0000 
16  .5231 
17  Brown, Vv. 1 .5820 3.6961 .9999 
18 Eastin 1 .5370 1 . 7957 .9637 
19  Speier .5383 .6349 .7373 
20 Duplissea .5540 4.8433 1 .0000 
21  Sher 0 .5061 .2727 .6067 
22 Quackenbush 1 .4960 5.0575 1 .0000 
23 Vasconcellos 0 .5301 .2524 .5996 
24 Cortese 1 .5523 .9779 .8360 
25 Areias .4889 1 .4056 .9201 
26 Johnston 0 .4965 -.0785 .4687 
27 Condit .4878 .2471 .5976 
28 Farr 1 .5014 .0368 .5150 
29 .Seastrand .4212 4.5804 1 .0000 
30 Costa 0 .4749 -.5929 .2766 . -31 'Bronzan 1 :"1759 . 1..4282 .9234 
32 Jones 1 .4511 5.3913 1 .0000 
33 Harvey 1 .5051 5.0426 1 .0000 
34 Wyman 1 .4879 3.8155 .9999 
35 O'Connell 0 .4538 - 1 . 1040 . 1348 
36 McClintock 1 .4957 5.3684 1 .0000 
37 Wright 1 .4554 4.5509 1 .0000 
38 LaFollette 1 .4431 4.5821 1 .0000 
39 Katz 1 .4310 1 .7755 .9621 
40 Bane 30 .4152 -.8389 .2008 
Table 7 cont. 
District Member Roi! Call P0(v1 = 1 ) z P1(v1 = 1 ) 
41 Nolan 1 .4697 6.0181 1 .0000 
42 Mountjoy 1 .4605 4.6332 1 .0000 
43 Friedman 0 .4209 -1 .0223 . 1533 
44 Hayden 0 .4104 -1 .6464 . . 0498 
45 Margolin 0 .4196 -1 .3289 .0919 
46 Ross 0 .4763 - .1 128 .4551 
47 Hughes 1 .7160 4.3511  1 .0000 
48 Waters, M. 1 .7120 3.7080 1 .0000 
49 Moore 1 .5928 2.0888 .9816 
50 Tucker 1 .6121 2.3913 .99 16  
5 1  Felan do 1 .4702 4.8930 1.0000 
52 Hill 1 .4706 5.6229 1 .0000 
53 Floyd 1 .5322 1 .4454 .9258 
54 Zeltner 1 .5609 6.4469 1 .0000 
55 Polanco 1 .4420 .4859 .6865 
56 Roybal-Allard 0 .4652 -.2434 .4039 
57 Elder 1 .5063 .6664 .7474 
58 Brown, D. .5176 6.7155 1 .0000 
59 Calderon .4516 - .3349 .3689 
60 Tanner 0 .4556 -.3637 .3580 
61 Leonard 1 .4365 4.7164 1 .0000 
62 Lancaster 1 .4679 3.6280 .9999 
63 Grisham 1 .4567 5.3186 1 .0000 
64 Johnson 1 .4790 6.5179 1 .0000 
65 Bader 1 .5206 5.6241 1 .0000 
66 Eaves .4720 .3843 .6496 
67 Lewis 1 .5024 6.3496 1 .0000 
68 Clute 1 .5353 2.9652 .9985 
69 Frizzelle 1 .5196 6.3459 1 .0000 
70 Ferguson 1 .5468 6.2023 1 .0000 
71 Allen .4583 5.2154 1 .0000 
72 'Longshore 1 · c:4'656 . .  · ·5:3359 1.0000 
73 Kelley 1 .5119 6.0360 1 .0000 
74 Frazee 1 .5203 4.3549 1 .0000 
75 Majonnier 1 .5551 6.3461 1 .0000 
76 Bradley 1 .5299 5.9871 1 .0000 
77 Stirling 1 .5445 6.2116 1 .0000 
78 Kille a 1 .5514 2.6194 .9956 
79 Chacon 1 .5846 1 .9792 .9761 
80 Peace .5934 2.3456 .9905 
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